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Abstract—In this paper a hierarchical one-leader-multi-
followers game for a class of continuous-time nonlinear systems
with disturbance is investigated by a novel policy iteration rein-
forcement learning technique in which, the game model consists
both of the zero-sum and nonzero-sum games, simultaneously. An
adaptive dynamic programming (ADP) method is developed to
achieve optimal control strategy under worst case of disturbance.
This algorithm reduces the number of neural networks which are
used for estimation for about thirty percent. Proposed algorithm
uses neural networks to estimate value functions, control policies
and disturbances. Convergence analysis of the estimations is
investigated using Lyapunov theory and exploiting properties of
the Nemytskii operator. Finally the simulation results will show
effectiveness of developed ADP method.
Index Terms—Adaptive dynamic programming (ADP); Opti-
mal control; Nonlinear systems; Hierarchical game; Nemytskii
operator; Neural networks; Reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, the optimal control theory has penetratedin various disciplines from aerospace engineering to
resource management [1]–[4]. Based on its merits and im-
portance, the scholars have developed different approaches
to study the dynamic optimization problems [5]. One of the
main trends in optimal control systems has been provided by
Bellman, namely the optimality principle, and now extended to
more complex versions. The adaptive dynamic programming
(ADP) is one of these extensions whose essential root is the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation [6]–[15].
Inspiring by the reinforcement learning (RL) techniques,
the ADP resolves some drawbacks of the classical dynamic
programming (DP) like curse of dimensionality [16]. As a
matter of fact, the kernel of the operation of ADP is estimating
the cost functional by a function approximating mechanism
and then solving the DP problem forward in time. Based on
its efficient performance, the ADP is widely used in numerous
optimal control problems such as power system control [17],
[18], battery management [19], [20] and autopilot systems
[21], [22].
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In a multi-agent system, when the control strategy of an
agent affects the cost function of other players (e.g. through
system’s dynamic) one can model the problem as a dynamic
game rather than a single optimal control problem. Usually,
in a dynamic game with non-quadratic cost, nonlinear or
unknown dynamics, the closed form of the solution which is
known as the equilibrium point of the game, cannot be found
and therefore, the ADP method can be utilized as a promising
tool to estimate the solution.
Dynamic games can be classified based on the sum of the
cost functions into zero-sum (ZS) and nonzero-sum (NZS)
games [23]–[26]. In ZS games, two major approaches have
been proposed in [27] where the underlying system is linear:
the on-line algorithm based on the integral RL in which some
partial information of the dynamical system is needed, and the
off-line algorithm based on the policy iteration (PI) wherein
full information of the system is utilized. The extension of
the approach for an unknown nonlinear dynamical system
has been studied in [28]. In [29], an ADP method has been
proposed for input constraint ZS dynamic game. For the linear
systems with partially measurable states in presence of various
matched uncertainties, a robust ADP method for the ZS game
has been explored in [30]. An on-line iterative ADP algorithm
has been proposed in [31] with known disturbance matrix and
unknown state and control matrices.
In contrast to the ZS games, where the goals of the players
are fully opposed and the equilibrium point is known as
the saddle point, in NZS games the equilibrium strategy of
the game is defined as a strategy profile of the players in
which, no player can lower its cost function by changing
its control strategy, while the other players do not change
their strategy. This equilibrium strategy is also known as Nash
equilibrium point. In [32], a PI-ADP approach for a NZS game
with nonlinear discrete-time dynamic has been proposed and
both on-line and off-line algorithms has been investigated. An
on-line method for multi-player NZS games which requires
complete knowledge of system dynamics has been presented
in [23]. In [33], an off-policy IRL method for a continuous-
time multiplayer NZS game with unknown dynamics has been
explored. Utilizing the actor-critic-identifier (ACI), without
full information of the system dynamics is another important
approach in NZS games. This technique is adopted in [34] to
approximately solve a set of coupled HJB equations of the
proposed N player NZS game.
All of the mentioned research works which have used
the ADP method to solve dynamic games, only considered
the case that the players decide simultaneously. However,
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the problem becomes more complicated when the players
decide in hierarchical scheme. In dynamic Nash games where
the strategy of each player affects other players’ costs and
strategies, indirectly through the state of the system and the
players have access to the state measurement, the Nash optimal
strategy of the game can be obtained using ADP to solve
HJB equations of the players, simultaneously. However, in a
hierarchical (e.g. one-leader-multi-followers) game, since the
strategies of the followers depend both on the strategy of the
leader and the state of the system, finding the Stackelberg-
Nash equilibrium point of the game and the proof of conver-
gence of the ADP algorithm to the equilibrium point of the
game become more complicated.
The basic type of hierarchical games is the leader-follower
or Stackelberg game which was introduced by H. von Stack-
elberg in 1934 [35]. In this game, the leader decides first
at the upper level (level 1), and in the lower level (level
2), the follower decides upon the decision of the leader is
revealed [36]–[39]. The leader-follower game has widespread
applications in many engineering fields like smart grids and
cognitive radio network [40], [41].
Dynamic Stackelberg games are well studied in the case
of linear dynamic and quadratic cost [42]–[45]. However,
studies on dynamic Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamic
and non quadratic cost are fairly scarce. In [46] the authors
proposed a heuristic iterative algorithm for solving dynamic
Stackelberg game, however the convergence of the proposed
algorithm was not proven. In [47] discrete time dynamic
Stackelberg games with general form of dynamic and cost is
studied and dynamic programming approach is used to derive
the Bellman equation and find the optimal solution. However,
for continuous time systems the Bellman optimality principle
leads to the well known HJB equation. In non-LQ continuous
time problems like our case, the HJB equation cannot be
solved analytically and ADP is a promising approach which
can be utilized to obtain the value function and optimal
strategy.
The ADP method has been utilized to solve non-LQ dy-
namic Nash-games in the literature like [28], [33], neverthe-
less, to the best of authors’ knowledge, the ADP has not
been explored to solve nonlinear-non-quadratic Stackelberg
games up to now. In this paper, an on-line ADP method is
proposed to obtain the equilibrium point of a group of dynamic
continuous time hierarchical nonlinear non-quadratic games.
Further, the proposed algorithm is robust with respect to
uncertainty which is considered as an exogenous disturbance.
In the upper level (level 1) of the game, the leader acts first
and plays a Stackelberg game with the followers. At the lower
level (level 2), the followers play an N -player non-cooperative
Nash game and decide simultaneously after the leader. All the
players also play a ZS game with the disturbance.
Because of the non-simultaneous decision making in our
proposed game, the strategy of the leader appears in the Nash
strategy of the followers, since the best response of each
follower is a function of both the current state and the strategy
of the leader. Such dependency imposes more difficulties when
we want to calculate the equilibrium strategies of the players
and also to prove the convergence of the ADP algorithm to
the equilibrium point of the game. To overcome this issue,
we have used Nemytskii operator and neural networks. In
the proposed ADP algorithm, neural networks are used in
actor-critic scheme. Update rules for critic and actor networks
are obtained using gradient descent and adaptive control,
respectively. Convergence analysis of the ADP method to
equilibrium point of the game is performed using Lyapunov
theory and exploiting the properties of Nemytskii operator.
In addition, the number of neural networks used in actor-
critic method is reduced with respect to similar works [25],
[30] which facilitates the training procedure and speeds up the
convergence.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as fol-
lows:
• Using an ADP-based method to solve a class of differen-
tial hierarchical games with nonlinear dynamic and non-
quadratic cost in presence of disturbance for the first time.
• Convergence analysis of ADP algorithm to the
Stackelberg-Nash-Saddle equilibrium point of the
proposed game model by guaranteeing the uniform
ultimate boundedness (UUB) condition.
• Using Nemytskii operator in the ADP-based methods for
the first time to overcome the complexity of computing
the leader’s optimal strategy.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section II
the problem is formulated and the proposed game model is
discussed. Some preliminaries are reviewed in Section III. Sec-
tion IV devotes to the main results in which the final solution
is obtained in three serial steps. A numerical simulation in
Section V, verifies the obtained theoretical results. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The general scheme and information structure of the pro-
posed hierarchical game in this paper is adopted from [45]
where the authors studied discrete time linear-quadratic hier-
archical dynamic games. The game consists of N + 2 players:
one leader, N followers and a disturbance. The players decide
in a dynamic environment. The sate dynamic equation of the
system is known to all players and also they have closed loop
information about the state of the system. The strategy of all
players appear in the state dynamic equation of the system
and therefore, the objective function of all players are coupled
indirectly through the state of the system. The disturbance
is considered as a virtual player who wants to provide the
worst case condition for the objective function of all players.
In the lower level (level 2) of the proposed hierarchy, the
followers play a dynamic Nash game with each other and also
play a zero-sum game with the disturbance. The followers
decide simultaneously and they don’t have information about
other followers’ costs and strategies, while they know the
leader’s strategy. At this level, each follower independently
updates its value function and best response strategy to the
other followers’ strategies and disturbance. In the higher level
(level 1) of the game, the leader uses the obtained strategies
of the followers as the reaction of the followers to play a ZS
game with disturbance and find its min-max optimal strategy.
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Since there is a Stackelberg, a Nash and (N+1) ZS games in
this model, the equilibrium point of the whole game is called
Stackelberg-Nash-saddle equilibrium. A schematic diagram of
the proposed game structure is shown in Fig. 1. Consider a
Leader
Follower
1
Follower
2
Follower
N
zero-sum game
with disturbance
ZS
Nash game
Stackelberg
     game
Level 1
Level 2
ZS ZS
ZS
ZS
Fig. 1: Game model.
dynamical system with one leader and N followers playing
over a state space whose evolution dictated by the following
differential equation:
x˙(t) = f(x) +
N∑
j=1
gj(x)uj + p(x)ν + h(x)ω (1)
where x(t) ∈ X ⊂ Rn, uj(t) ∈ U j ⊂ Rmj , ν(t) ∈ N ⊂
Rα , and ω(t) ∈ W ⊂ Rw, are state vector, controls or actions
of followers, control or action of leader, and disturbance,
respectively. Moreover, f : Rn → Rn is a Lipschitz vector
function with f(0) = 0, and gj : Rn → Rn×mj , j = 1, ...N ,
h : Rn → Rn×α, p : Rn → Rn×w are some continuous
matrices. In addition, similar to [23], [34], [48], it is assumed
that ‖gi(x)‖ < bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , ‖h(x)‖ < bh and
‖p(x)‖ < bp. The leader’s decision is based on followers’ ra-
tionality. All players make decisions in such way to minimize
their cost functionals in the worst case scenario generated by
the disturbance with attenuation level γ as follows:
Vi =
∫ ∞
t
(
Qi(x(τ)) +
N∑
j=1
uTj (τ)Rijuj(τ)
+ νT (τ)Siν(τ)− γ2ωT (τ)ω(τ)
)
dτ
=
∫ ∞
t
ri(x(τ),u1(τ),u2(τ), . . . ,uN (τ),ν(τ),ω(τ))dτ
(2)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N are followers and i = N + 1 is the leader.
Functions Qi(x(t)) > 0 are generally nonlinear and satisfy
Qi(x) ≥ ϑixTx for certain positive constants ϑi, γ is a scalar,
and Si > 0, Rii > 0, Rij ≥ 0 are known and symmetric
matrices. In the subsequent, the parameter t is dropped for the
sake of simplicity.
Based on the given points, the goal is to find a set of state
feedback control policies which minimize cost functions in the
worst case strategy of disturbance player. In the subsection 3.1
we solve the game in the lower level (level 2) for followers
and then the obtained solution is used in subsection 3.2 to
solve the leader’s problem in the upper level (level 1) and
complete the solution of the proposed bi-level game. Then
in the subsection 3.3, the update rules for critic and actor
networks are introduced and the convergence of the proposed
algorithm is proven.
III. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
Definition 1 ( [49] Nash Equilibrium). An N -tuple of strate-
gies {γ1∗,γ2∗, ...,γN∗} with γi∗ ∈ Γi, where Γi is ith player
strategy set, i ∈ Z+, is said to constitute a Nash equilibrium
solution for N -person nonzero-sum finite game in extensive
form, if the following N inequalities are satisfied for all
γi ∈ Γi, i ∈ Z+ :
J i(γ1∗, ...,γN∗) ≤ J i(γ1∗, ...,γ(i−1)∗,γi,γ(i+1)∗, ...,γN∗)
(3)
The N -tuple of quantities {J1∗, J2∗, ..., JN∗} is known as a
Nash equilibrium outcome of the nonzero-sum finite game in
extensive form.
Definition 2 ( [49] Stackelberg Game). In a Stackelberg game
a player (leader) has the ability to enforce his strategy on the
other player (follower). In this game leader acts first and then
follower reacts to leader’s decision. A strategy γ1∗ ∈ Γ1 is
called a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader, if
J1∗ = max
γ2∈R2(γ1∗)
J1(γ1∗, γ2)
= min
γ1∈Γ1
max
γ2∈R2(γ1)
J1(γ1, γ2) (4)
where Γ1 , J1(γ1, γ2) and Γ2 , J2(γ1, γ2) are pure strategy
spaces and costs of leader and follower, respectively. Also the
set R2(γ1) ⊂ Γ2 defined for each γ1 ∈ Γ1 by
R2(γ1) = {ξ ∈ Γ2 : J2(γ1, ξ) ≤ J2(γ1, γ2), ∀γ2 ∈ Γ2}
(5)
is the optimal response set of follower to the strategy γ1 ∈ Γ1
of leader.
Definition 3 ( [49] Differential Game). Consider a game with
two players who decide in a dynamic environment as follows
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u1(t), u2(t)) (6)
and the cost functionals of the players ∀t ∈ [t0, T ] defined as:
Li(u1, u2) =
∫ T
t0
gi(t, x(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt+ qi(x(T )) (7)
where [t0, T ] denotes the prescribed duration of the game.
If the players decide simultaneously, then the game is called
differential Nash game or simply differential game and if
they decide in leader-follower scheme, the game is called
differential Stackelberg game.
iv
Definition 4 ( [50] Nemytskii Operator). Consider a set Ψ
which is a measure or metric space and let X and Y be
two Hausdorff topological spaces. The Nemytskii operator is
defined by:
Nf (u)(z) , f(z,u(z)) ∀z ∈ Ψ (8)
in which f : Ψ×X → Y .
As can be seen from the definition, the Nemytskii operator
assigns the Y -valued z 7−→ f(z,u(z)) to each function
u : Ψ → X . Another concept is the uniformly ultimately
boundedness (UUB) property of a signal.
Definition 5 ( [51] UUB). The solutions of the nonlinear
dynamical system x˙(t) = f(t,x) with x(t0) = x0, are
uniformly ultimately bounded with ultimate bound b if there
exists a positive constant c , independent of t0, and for every
a ∈ (0, c), there is a T (a, b) ≥ 0, such that:
‖x(t0)‖ ≤ a ⇒ ‖x(t)‖ ≤ b, ∀t ≥ t0 + T. (9)
IV. MAIN RESULTS
According to cost functionals (2), the optimal value func-
tions for all the players in presence of disturbance are obtained
using min-max optimization as follows:
V ?i (x,u•,ν,ωi) = min
ui
max
ωi
∫ ∞
t
(
Qi(x)
+
N∑
j=1
uTj Rijuj + ν
TSiν − γ2ωTi ωi
)
dτ (10)
V ?N+1(x,u•,ν,ωN+1) = min
ν
max
ωN+1
∫ ∞
t
(
QN+1(x)
+
N∑
j=1
uTj R(N+1)juj + ν
TSN+1ν − γ2ωTN+1ωN+1
)
dτ
(11)
where u• = {u1,u2, . . . ,uN} and 1 ≤ i ≤ N . For the
optimal set u∗•,ν
∗,ω∗ the HJB equation holds as follows:
Hi(x,∇xV ∗i ,u∗•,ν∗,ω∗) +
∂Vi
∂t
= 0 (12)
where
Hi(x,∇xVi,u•,ν,ω) = ri(x,u•,ν,ω) + (∇xVi)T
(
f(x)
+
N∑
j=1
gj(x)uj + h(x)ω + p(x)ν
)
(13)
In proceeding the aim is to find the optimal policies of
followers and leader and then solving the whole game. Also
from now on, the subscript x in ∇x is dropped for the sake
of simplicity.
A. Level 2: Followers-Disturbance Game
According to (2) the cost functionals are convex and con-
cave with respect to controls and disturbance, respectively. The
minimum and maximum of the Hamiltonian can be directly
computed by the stationary condition as follows:
∂Hi
∂ui
= 0 ⇒ u?i (x) = −
1
2
R−1ii g
T
i (x)∇Vi (14)
∂Hi
∂ωi
= 0 ⇒ ω?i (x) =
1
2
γ−2hT (x)∇Vi (15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (13), N coupled Hamilton-
Jacobi equations can be obtained:
Qi(x) +
1
4
N∑
j=1
(∇Vj)T gj(x)R−1jj RijR−1jj gTj (x)∇Vj
− γ
−2
4
(∇Vi)Th(x)hT (x)(∇Vi) + νTSiν
+ (∇Vi)T
f(x) + N∑
j=1
gj(x)uj + p(x)ν + h(x)ω
 = 0
(16)
Since neither Vi’s nor optimal control strategies can be com-
puted in a closed form, a conventional way is to approximate
the value functions and control strategies with general function
approximators (GFAs). A common tool that is employed in
implementing the GFA, is neural networks. Therefore, the
solutions of (16) on a compact set Ω ⊆ Rn which contains
the origin are approximated by NNs as follows:
Vi(x,ν) = W
T
viφvi(x,ν) + vi(x,ν), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (17)
where φvi(., .) ∈ Rκ and vi are NN activation functions
and NN approximation errors, respectively. In [48] it has
been shown that always there exists a number of hidden-layer
neurons which makes the controls admissible and vi ’s tend to
zero as the number of hidden-layer neurons tends to infinity.
It should be mentioned that because of hierarchical nature of
the game, Vis , 1 ≤ i ≤ N are obtained as functions of x
and ν. After calculating ν for the leader, the value functions
would obtain in terms of x and then, it is be substituted in
control policies of the followers.
In proceeding the new variables:
Cij = ∇φvjgj(x)R−1jj RijR−1jj gTj (x)∇φTvj
Ei = γ
−2∇φvih(x)hT (x)∇φTvi
Dji = ∇φvigj(x)R−1jj gTj (x)∇φTvj
are introduced for simplicity. Substituting the value function
approximations from (17) into (16) yields:
1
4
N∑
j=1
WTvjC
i
jWvj −
1
4
WTviEiWvi +Qi(x) + ν
TSiν
+WTvi
(
∇φvif(x)−
1
2
N∑
j=1
DjiWvj +∇φvip(x)ν
+
1
2
EiWvi
)
= HJi(x,ν) (18)
vwhere HJi(x,ν) is the error incurred by replacing the actual
value functions with the approximated ones (17). Now, ac-
cording to (17), the equations (14) and (15) can be rewritten
as:
ui(x,ν) = −1
2
R−1ii g
T
i (x)∇φTvi(x,ν)Wvi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N
(19)
ωi(x,ν) =
1
2
γ−2hT (x)∇φTvi(x,ν)Wvi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N (20)
Since the ideal weights Wvi ’s are unknown, Vis and the
control policies and disturbances should be defined in the form
of critic and action neural networks, respectively as follows for
1 ≤ i ≤ N :
Vˆi(x,ν) = Wˆ
T
viφvi(x,ν), (21)
uˆi(x,ν) = −1
2
R−1ii g
T
i (x)∇φTvi(x,ν)Wˆai , (22)
ωˆi(x,ν) =
1
2
γ−2hT (x)∇φTvi(x,ν)Wˆai (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) in (16), the following expression is
obtained:
1
4
N∑
j=1
WˆTajC
i
jWˆaj −
1
4
WˆTaiEiWˆai +Qi(x) + νˆ
TSiνˆ
+ WˆTvi
(
∇φvif(x)−
N∑
j=1
1
2
DjiWˆaj +∇φvip(x)νˆ
+
1
2
EiWˆai
)
= ei(x,ν) (24)
where ei(x,ν) is the error incurred by replacing ideal weights
of NNs with their approximate values.
B. Level 1: Leader-Disturbance Game
Similar to the previous subsection, the value function and
critic NN of the leader can be approximated as follows:{
VN+1(x) = W
T
vN+1φvN+1 + vN+1(x)
VˆN+1(x) = Wˆ
T
vN+1φvN+1(x)
(25)
After applying stationary condition of ω to the leader’s Hamil-
tonian function similar to (23), one can get:
ωˆN+1(x) =
1
2
γ−2hT (x)∇φTvN+1(x)WˆaN+1 (26)
Substituting (25) and (26) into the leader’s Hamiltonian, one
can get:
1
4
N∑
j=1
WTvjC
N+1
j Wvj −
1
4
WTvN+1EN+1WvN+1
+ νˇTSN+1νˇ +QN+1(x) +W
T
vN+1
(
∇φvN+1f(x)
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
DjN+1Wvj +∇φvN+1p(x)νˇ
+
1
2
EN+1WvN+1
)
= HJN+1(x, νˇ) (27)
and
1
4
N∑
j=1
WˆTajC
N+1
j Wˆaj −
1
4
WˆTaN+1EN+1WˆaN+1
+ νˆTSN+1νˆ +QN+1(x) + Wˆ
T
vN+1
(
∇φvN+1f(x)
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
DjN+1Wˆaj +∇φvN+1p(x)νˆ
+
1
2
EN+1WˆaN+1
)
= eN+1(x, νˆ) (28)
where νˇ and νˆ are functions of exact and approximated NNs
weights, respectively. In proceeding new variables
BN+1j = gj(x)R
−1
jj R(N+1)jR
−1
jj g
T
j (x)
Πˇ = pT (x)∇φTvN+1WvN+1
Πˆ = pT (x)∇φTvN+1WˆvN+1
AˇN+1j = WvjW
T
vN+1∇φvN+1gj(x)R−1jj gTj (x)
AˆN+1j = WˆajWˆ
T
vN+1∇φvN+1gj(x)R−1jj gTj (x)
are introduced for simplicity. Now stationary condition of νˇ
is applied to (27):
∂HN+1
∂νˇ
= Πˇ +
[
1
2
N∑
j=1
(
∂∇φvj (x, νˇ)
∂νˇ
)T
WvjW
T
vj
×∇φvj (x, νˇ)BN+1j − AˇN+1j
]
+ 2SN+1νˇ = 0
(29)
Thus
νˇ = −1
2
S−1N+1
[
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
(
∂∇φvj (x, νˇ)
∂νˇ
)T (
AˇN+1j
−WvjWTvj∇φvj (x, νˇ)BN+1j
)
+ Πˇ
]
(30)
similar to (30):
νˆ = −1
2
S−1N+1
[
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
(
∂∇φvj (x, νˆ)
∂νˆ
)T (
AˆN+1j
− WˆajWˆTaj∇φvj (x, νˆ)BN+1j
)
+ Πˆ
]
(31)
To obtain the optimal strategy of the leader, we need to solve
(31) for νˆ. However, (31) cannot be solved analytically with
respect to νˆ. Therefore, to obtain the solution iteratively, we
rewrite (31) as an iterative equation in which, the fixed point
of the iterative equation is the optimal strategy of the leader:
νˆk+1 = −1
2
S−1N+1
[
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
(
∂∇φvj (x, νˆk)
∂νˆk
)T (
AˆN+1j
−WvjWTvj∇φvj (x, νˆk)BN+1j
)
+ Πˆ
]
(32)
vi
To prove existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of
iterative equation (32), the Nemytskii operator is utilized
and(31) is rewritten as follows:
νˆ(x) = Ξ(x, νˆ(x)) + ξ(x) (33)
where
ξ(x) = −1
2
S−1N+1p
T (x)∇φTvN+1WˆvN+1 ,
where ξ(x) ∈ W 1,β(Ω), 1 ≤ β ≤ ∞ and W 1,β(Ω) is a
Sobolev space and Ξ : Ω × Rα → Rα is a Caratheodory
function such that the Nemytskii operator NΞ is continuous
and bounded [50]. In the proceeding lemma the condition in
which the whole game has a unique Stackelberg-Nash-saddle
equilibrium is introduced.
Lemma 6. Equation (33) has a unique solution νˆ ∈W 1,β(Ω)
if Lipschitz coefficient ‖Ξ‖Lip is less than one.
Proof: Suppose that there exist solutions νˆ1 and νˆ2, so
from (33) it is concluded that Ξ(x, νˇ1)−Ξ(x, νˆ2) = νˆ1− νˆ2.
Thus
Ξ(x, νˆ1)− Ξ(x, νˆ2) = νˆ1 − νˆ2 ≤ ‖Ξ‖Lip
(
νˆ1 − νˆ2
)
(34)
Now if the Lipschitz coefficient ‖Ξ‖Lip is less than one, the
assumption of existing more than one solution is incorrect.
According to the condition in Lemma 6, the Nemytskii
operator NΞ has a unique fixed point and then νˆ can
be calculated iteratively. The following NN is used for
approximating νˆ:
νˆ = WˆTν φν (35)
where Wˆν ∈ Rµ×α and φν ∈ Rµ. Then the gradient descent
is used for updating Wˆν :
WˆTν φν +
1
2
S−1N+1
[
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
(
∂∇φvj (x, νˆ)
∂νˆ
)T (
AˆN+1j
− WˆajWˆTaj∇φvj (x, νˆ)BN+1j
)
+ Πˆ
]
= eν (36)
and
˙ˆ
Wν = −%∂e
T
ν eν
∂Wˆν
Where % is the learning rate. The proof of convergence of the
above gradient based update rule is given in Theorem 7.
Now the results for both leader and followers are used to solve
the hierarchical game in the next subsection.
C. The Main Hierarchical Game
The errors, eis, in (24) and (28), are used for updating critic
NNs’ weights with gradient descent approach:
E =
N+1∑
i=1
eTi ei ⇒ ˙ˆWvi = −τi
∂E
∂Wˆvi
(37)
The following facts can be concluded:
1) The NN approximation errors and their gradients are
bounded:
‖vi‖ < bi , ‖∇xvi‖ < bxi
2) The NN activation functions and their gradients are
bounded:
‖φvi(x,ν)‖ < bφi , ‖∇xφvi(x,ν)‖ < bφix
‖∇ν∇xφvi(x,ν)‖ < bφixν
3) The ideal NN weights are bounded:
‖Wvi‖ < Wimax , ‖Wν‖ < Wνmax
In the following theorem update rules and ultimate bounded-
ness of errors are analyzed.
Theorem 7. Consider the dynamical system (1) with critic
NNs (21) and control inputs (22) and (23). The tuning laws
for the critic NNs are ( for 1 ≤ i ≤ N + 1) :
˙ˆ
Wvi = −τiµi
(
ηTi Wˆvi +
1
4
N∑
j=1
WˆTajC
i
jWˆaj + νˆSiνˆ
− 1
4
WˆTaiEiWˆai +Qi(x)
)
(38)
where ηi = ∇φvi(f(x) +
∑N
j=1 gj(x)uˆj + p(x)νˆ + h(x)ωˆ),
ρi = η
T
i ηi + 1 , η¯i =
ηi
ρi
and η¯iρi = µi . The tuning laws for
the leader NN and actor NNs are
˙ˆ
Wν = −%
{
N∑
j=1
(
∂WˆTν φν
∂Wˆν
)(
∂2∇φvj
∂νˆ2
)T[
− 1
4
AˆN+1j
× ΠˆTS−2N+1 +
1
8
N∑
k=1
AˆN+1j (Aˆ
N+1
k )
T
(
∂∇φvk
∂νˆ
)
S−2N+1
− 1
2
AˆN+1j φ
T
ν WˆνS
−1
N+1 +
1
4
WˆajWˆ
T
aj∇φvjBN+1j
× ΠˆTS−2N+1 +
1
8
N∑
k=1
WˆajWˆ
T
aj∇φvjBN+1j
×BN+1k ∇φTvkWˆakWˆTak
(
∂∇φvk
∂νˆ
)
S−2N+1
− 1
8
N∑
k=1
AˆN+1j B
N+1
k ∇φTvkWˆakWˆTak
(
∂∇φvk
∂νˆ
)
S−2N+1
+
1
2
WˆajWˆ
T
aj∇φvjBN+1j φTν WˆνS−1N+1 −
1
8
N∑
k=1
Wˆak
× WˆTak∇φvkBN+1k (AˆN+1j )T
(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)
S−2N+1
]
+
N∑
j=1
(
∂WˆTν φν
∂Wˆν
)(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)T[
1
8
N∑
k=1
WˆajWˆ
T
aj
×
(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)
S−2N+1
(
∂∇φvk
∂νˆ
)T
WˆakWˆ
T
ak
∇φvk
×BN+1j BN+1k +
1
4
WˆajWˆ
T
aj
(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)
S−2N+1Πˆ
vii
+
1
2
WˆajWˆ
T
aj
(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)
S−1N+1Wˆ
T
ν φνB
N+1
j
− 1
8
N∑
k=1
WˆakWˆ
T
ak
(
∂∇φvk
∂νˆ
)
S−2N+1
(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)T
× AˆN+1j BN+1k
]
+ 2φνφ
T
ν Wˆν + Πˆ
TS−1N+1
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
φν(Aˆ
N+1
j )
T
(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)
S−1N+1
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
φνB
N+1
j ∇φTvjWˆajWˆTaj
(
∂∇φvj
∂νˆ
)
S−1N+1
}
(39)
and
˙ˆ
Wai = −θi
[(
F i2Wˆai − F i1η¯Ti Wˆvi
)
− 1
4
N+1∑
k=1
Cki Wˆai
× µTk Wˆvk +
1
4
EiWˆaiWˆvi
]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (40)
˙ˆ
WaN+1 = −θN+1
[(
FN+12 WˆaN+1 − FN+11 η¯TN+1WˆvN+1
)
+
1
4
EN+1WˆaN+1µ
T
N+1WˆvN+1
]
(41)
respectively. F i1s and F
i
2s are tuning parameters that can be
selected as given in the proof of theorem in Appendix A.
In such condition there exists κ∗ so that for κ > κ∗ the
closed loop system states, the critic and actor NN errors are
UUB. Moreover, uˆis, ωˆis and νˆ converge to the approximate
Stackelberg-Nash-saddle equilibrium point of the game.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 8. Terms
(∂WˆTν φν
∂Wˆν
)
and φν are not equal, because
the first term is a gradient of a vector-valued function in Rα
with respect to a matrix in Rµ×α and hence is in Rµ×α×α
while the second term is a vector in Rµ. In some especial
cases these two terms become equal; e.g., α = 1 .
V. SIMULATION
In this section the proposed algorithm is implemented on a
hierarchical one-leader-two-followers game with nonlinear dy-
namic. Disturbance is considered as a uniform noise bounded
in [−0.5, 0.5] . following is the system dynamics:
x˙ = f(x) + g1(x)u1 + g2(x)u2 + p(x)ν + h(x)ω (42)
where f(x) = [f1(x) f2(x)]T and
f1(x) = x2
f2(x) = −x2 + 0.5x1 + 0.25x2(cos(2x1) + 2)2
+ 0.25x2(sin(4x
2
1) + 2)
2
g1(x) =
[
0
cos(2x1) + 2
]
, g1(x) =
[
0
sin(4x21) + 2
]
and
p(x) =
[
1
cos(x21) + 4
]
, h(x) =
[
sin(5x1) + 0.1
cos(2x21) + 0.2
]
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Fig. 2: Convergence of the critic NNs.
The parameters of performance index functions are Q1(x) =
2x21 + x
2
2, Q2(x) = x
2
1 + 4x
2
2, Q3(x) = x
4
1 + 2x
2
2, S1 = 4,
S2 = 2, S3 = 20 (since in real situations the effect of leader
is more than the effect of followers, S3 is more than S2 and
S1), R11 = 4, R12 = 1, R21 = 1, R22 = 2, R31 = 1,
R32 = 1 and the disturbance attenuation γ2 = 0.6. The initial
state x1(0) = x2(0) = 0.01. Initial values of NN weights,
Wˆvis, Wˆais and Wˆν for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, are randomly selected
in the interval (0, 1). Activation functions are φv1 = φv2 =
[x21, x
2
2, x1x2, x1ν, x2ν]
T , φv3 = [x
2
1, x
2
2, x
4
1, x
4
2, x
2
1x
2
2]
T and
φν = [x1, x2, x
2
1, x
2
2, x1x2]
T . Learning rates are τ1 = τ2 =
0.7 , τ3 = 0.6 , θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 0.7 and % = 0.6.
Tuning parameters F 12 = F
2
2 = F
3
2 = 200 and F
1
1 = F
2
1 =
F 31 = 100 × [1, 1, 1, 1, 1]T . Also a white Gaussian probing
noise is added for satisfying persistence of exitation condition.
viii
After convergence at about 80 seconds one could get Wv1 =
Wa1 = [2.752, 0.3777,−0.0334,−0.1469, 0.7363]T , Wv2 =
Wa2 = [1.0876, 0.1607, 0.1180, 0.4029, 0.9177]
T , Wv3 =
Wa3 = [1.0929,−0.2286, 2.8509, 0.0107, 0.3939]T and
Wν = [−0.4446,−0.0240, 0.0643, 0.5727, 0.5827, 0.2225]T
.System states are presented in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 3: Convergence of the leader NN.
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Fig. 4: Evolution of the system states.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper an on-line ADP-based method is developed
for solving a class of hierarchical one-leader-multi-followers
nonlinear differential games. The game discussed here was
made up of both zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. In the
proposed algorithm the value functions approximated with
NNs and the approximations improved by gradient descent.
Also the actor NN weights were updated using adaptive rules.
Using Lyapunov theory, it was showed that the NN weights
and system states are UUB. It was assumed that the game
had one equilibrium and the condition which satisfied this
assumption was derived using Nemytskii operator.
As a future work of this study, the effect of model parameter
uncertainties on the convergence of the on-line ADP can be
investigated.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Proof: The candidate Lyapunov function is defined as
follows
L(t) =
N+1∑
i=1
Vi(x) +
N+1∑
i=1
1
2
W˜Tviτ
−1
i W˜vi
+
N+1∑
i=1
1
2
W˜Taiθ
−1
i W˜ai (43)
where Wvi − Wˆvi = W˜vi and Wvi − Wˆai = W˜ai . Time
derivative of (43) is:
L˙(t) =
N+1∑
i=1
V˙i(x) +
N+1∑
i=1
W˜Tviτ
−1
i
˙˜Wvi +
N+1∑
i=1
W˜Taiθ
−1
i
˙˜Wai
(44)
Since the time derivative of value functions V˙i = (∇Vi)T x˙ =
(WTvi∇φvi +∇Ti )x˙ , one can get:
V˙i = W
T
vi
(
∇φvif(x)−
1
2
N∑
j=1
DjiWˆaj +
1
2
EiWˆai
+∇φvip(x)νˆ
)
± 1
2
N∑
j=1
WTviD
j
iWaj
± 1
2
WTviEiWai + ˙i
= WTviσi +
1
2
WTvi
N∑
j=1
DjiW˜aj −
1
2
WTviEiW˜ai
+WTvi∇φvip(x)(νˆ − νˇ) + ˙i (45)
where
˙i = ∇Ti
(
f(x)− 1
2
N∑
j=1
gj(x)R
−1
jj g
T
j (x)∇φTvjWˆaj
+
γ−2
2
h(x)hT (x)∇φTviWˆai + p(x)νˆ
)
(46)
σi = ∇φvi
(
f(x)− 1
2
N∑
j=1
gj(x)R
−1
jj g
T
j (x)∇φTvjWvj
+ p(x)νˇ +
γ−2
2
h(x)hT (x)∇φTviWvi
)
(47)
From (18) it is concluded that:
WTviσi = −Qi(x)−
1
4
N∑
j=1
WTvjC
i
jWvj
+
1
4
WTviEiWvi − νˇTSiνˇ + HJi (48)
ix
Now the second part of (44) is calculated according to (24)
and gradient descent method.
W˜Tviτ
−1
i
˙˜Wvi = W˜
T
vi
ηi
(ηTi ηi + 1)
2
(
ηTi Wˆvi +Qi(x)
+
N∑
j=1
uˆTj Rijuˆj + νˆSiνˆ − γ2ωˆT ωˆ
)
(49)
Now the terms in (49) which are in parentheses can be
rewritten as
Qi(x) +
1
4
N∑
j=1
(
Wvj − W˜aj
)T
Cij(Wvj − W˜aj )
− 1
4
(Wvi − W˜ai)TEi(Wvi − W˜ai)
+ (Wvi − W˜vi)Tηi + νˆTSiνˆ (50)
According to (47) and (48), (50) becomes
− W˜Tviηi + HJi +
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜ajC
i
jW˜aj + φ
T
ν WˆνSi
× WˆTν φν −
1
4
W˜TaiEiW˜ai − φTνWνSiWTν φν
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
WTvjC
i
jW˜aj
+WTvi
(
−∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φν +
1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
DijW˜aj
)
(51)
Thus
W˜Tviτ
−1
i
˙˜Wvi = W˜
T
vi
ηi
(ηTi ηi + 1)
2
(
− W˜Tviηi
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜TajC
i
jW˜aj −
1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
WTvjC
i
jW˜aj
+WTvi
(
−∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φνgj(x)R−1jj
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
DjiW˜aj
)
− 2φTν W˜νSiWTν φν
+ HJi −
γ−2
4
W˜TaiEiW˜ai + φ
T
ν W˜νSiW˜
T
ν φν
)
(52)
Now according to (45), (46), (48), and (52), (44) is rewritten
as:
L˙(x) =
N+1∑
i=1
(
−Qi(x) + HJi −
1
4
N∑
j=1
WTvjC
i
jWvj
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜TajC
i
jW˜ajµ
T
i W˜vi
+
1
4
WTviEiWvi − W˜Tvi η¯iη¯Ti W˜vi −
1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
W˜Taj
× CijWvjµTi W˜vi + W˜Taiθ−1i ˙˜Wai
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
W˜TajD
j
iWviµ
T
i W˜vi +
1
2
WTvi
N∑
j=1
Dji
× W˜aj −
1
2
WTviEiW˜ai + W˜
T
viµiHJi
−WTvi∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φν + φTν W˜νSiW˜Tν φν
× µTi W˜vi − W˜TviµiWTvi∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φν
− φTνWνSiWTν φν − 2φTν W˜νSiWTν φν
× µTi W˜vi −
1
4
W˜TaiEiW˜aiµ
T
i W˜vi
+∇Ti
(
f(x)− 1
2
N∑
j=1
gj(x)R
−1
jj g
T
j (x)∇φTvjWˆaj
+
γ−2
2
h(x)hT (x)∇φTviWˆai + p(x)νˆ
))
(53)
Expanding some terms in (53) yields:
L˙(x) =
N+1∑
i=1
(
−Qi(x) + HJi −
1
4
N∑
j=1
WTvjC
i
jWvj
− 1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜TajC
i
jWvjµ
T
i Wvi +∇Ti f(x)
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜TajC
i
jWvjµ
T
i W˜vi − W˜Tvi η¯iη¯Ti W˜vi
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
W˜TajC
i
jWvjµ
T
i W˜vi
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
W˜TajD
j
iWviµ
T
i W˜vi +
1
2
WTvi
N∑
j=1
Dji
× W˜aj −
1
2
WTviEiW˜ai + W˜
T
viµiHJi
−WTvi∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φν + φTν W˜νSiW˜Tν φν
× µTi W˜vi − W˜TviµiWTvi∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φν
+
1
4
W˜TaiEiWviµ
T
i Wvi − φTνWνSiWTν φν
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜TajC
i
jW˜ajµ
T
i Wvi −
1
4
W˜TaiEiW˜ai
× µTi Wvi − 2φTν W˜νSiWTν φνµTi W˜vi
+
1
4
WTviEiWvi −
1
4
W˜TaiEiWviµ
T
i W˜vi
+∇Ti
(
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
gj(x)R
−1
jj g
T
j (x)∇φTvjWvj
+
γ−2
2
h(x)hT (x)∇φTviWvi + p(x)νˇ
)
−∇Ti
(
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
gj(x)R
−1
jj g
T
j (x)∇φTvjW˜aj
x+
γ−2
2
h(x)hT (x)∇φTviW˜ai + p(x)ν˜
))
−
N∑
i=1
W˜Tai
[
θ−1i
˙ˆ
Wai −
1
4
N∑
k=1
Cki
× WˆaiµTk Wˆvk +
1
4
EiWˆaiµ
T
i Wˆvi
]
− W˜TaN+1
[
θ−1N+1
˙ˆ
WaN+1
+
1
4
EN+1WˆaN+1µ
T
N+1WˆvN+1
]
(54)
where νˇ − νˆ = ν˜. So update rules for action networks are
defined as:
˙ˆ
Wai = −θi
[
(F i2Wˆai − F i1η¯Ti Wˆvi)−
1
4
N∑
k=1
Cki Wˆai
× µTk Wˆvk +
1
4
EiWˆaiµ
T
i Wˆvi
]
1 ≤ i ≤ N
(55)
˙ˆ
WaN+1 = −θN+1
[
(FN+12 WˆaN+1 − FN+11 η¯TN+1WˆvN+1)
+
1
4
EN+1WˆaN+1µ
T
N+1WˆvN+1
]
(56)
where F i2s and F
i
1s are tuning parameters and they should be
selected as mentioned in proceed of proof. With these tuning
laws the following terms added to L˙(x):
N+1∑
i=1
W˜Tai
(
F i2Wvi−F i2W˜ai−F i1η¯Ti Wvi+F i1η¯Ti W˜vi
)
(57)
Now (44) becomes
L˙(x) =
N+1∑
i=1
(
−Qi(x) + HJi −
1
4
N∑
j=1
WTvjC
i
jWvj
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜TajC
i
jW˜ajµ
T
i Wvi
+
1
4
WTviEi(Wvi − 2W˜ai)− W˜Tvi η¯iη¯Ti W˜vi
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
W˜Taj (C
i
j −Dji )WvjµTi W˜vi +∇Ti f(x)
−WTvi∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φν + φTν W˜νSi(W˜ν − 2Wν)T
× φνµTi W˜vi − W˜TviµiWTvi∇φvip(x)W˜Tν φν
+
1
4
W˜TaiEi(Wvi − W˜ai)µTi Wvi − φTνWνSi
×WTν φν +
1
2
WTvi
N∑
j=1
DjiW˜aj
+
1
4
N∑
j=1
W˜TajC
i
jWvjµ
T
i (W˜vi −Wvi)
− 1
4
W˜TaiEiWviµ
T
i W˜vi + W˜
T
viµiHJi
+ W˜Tai
(
F i2Wvi − F i2W˜ai − F i1η¯Ti Wvi
+ F i1η¯
T
i W˜vi
)
+∇Ti
(
+ p(x)(Wν − W˜ν)Tφν
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
gj(x)R
−1
jj g
T
j (x)∇φTvj (Wvj − W˜aj )
+
γ−2
2
h(x)hT (x)∇φTvi(Wvi − W˜ai)
))
(58)
A new parameter is defined which only has ideal weights:
Υ =
N+1∑
i=1
(
HJi −
1
4
N∑
j=1
WTvjC
i
jWvj +
1
4
WTviEiWvi
− φTνWνSiWTν φν +∇Ti p(x)WTν φν
+∇Ti
(
− 1
2
N∑
j=1
gj(x)R
−1
jj g
T
j (x)∇φTvjWvj
+
γ−2
2
h(x)hT (x)∇φTviWvi
)
(59)
According to the assumptions, Υ has an upper bound, Υmax.
Since HJis are NN approximations errors of value functions,
κ (number of hidden layers in NNs) can be selected such that
to decrease these errors to a desired constant:
∀i > 0, ∃κ∗ s.t. sup
x∈Ω
‖HJi‖ < i for κ > κ∗
Now by assuming κ > κ∗ and defining Z˜1 = x, Z˜2 =
[W˜Tv1 η¯1, . . . ,W˜
T
vN+1 η¯N+1]
T , Z˜3 = [W˜Ta1 , . . . ,W˜
T
aN+1 ]
T ,
Z˜4 = W˜
T
ν φν , and Z˜ = [Z˜
T
1 , Z˜
T
2 , Z˜
T
3 , Z˜
T
4 ]
T , (44) can be
rewritten as
L˙(x) = Υ + Z˜T2
(
Z˜T4 ⊗ IN+1
)
SZ˜4 − Z˜TMZ˜
+ Z˜T

λ1
λ2
...
λ2N+4
+∇Ti f(x) (60)
Where ⊗ is the Kronecker product, IN+1 is the identity matrix
and S = [ST1 , S
T
2 , . . . , S
T
N+1]
T . By assuming 2 ≤ a ≤ N + 2,
N +3 ≤ b ≤ 2N +2, i = a−1 and j = b−N −2, the blocks
of symmetric matrix M and vector Λ are:
m11 =
N+1∑
l=1
ϑl
maa = 1
mba =
1
8ρi
CijWvj −
1
4ρi
DjiWvi , i 6= j
mba = − 1
8ρj
DjjWvj +
1
8
EjWvj −
1
2
F j1 , i = j
mbb = −1
4
N+1∑
l=1
Cljµ
T
l Wvl
+
1
4
Ejµ
T
j Wvj + F
j
2
ma(2N+4) =
1
2ρi
WTvi∇φvip(x) +
1
ρi
φTνWνSi
m(2N+3)(2N+3) =
1
4
EN+1µ
T
N+1 + F
N+1
2
xi
m1a = m1b = m1(2N+3) = m1(2N+4) = mb(2N+3)
= mb(2N+4) = m(2N+3)(2N+4)
= m(2N+4)(2N+4) = 0 (61)
ma(2N+3) =
{
1
8EN+1WvN+1 − 12FN+11 , a = N + 2
0, a 6= N + 2
and
λ1 = 0 (62)
λa =
HJi
ρi
λb =
1
2
N+1∑
l=1
(
Djl
)T
Wvl −
1
2
EjWvj
− 1
4
N+1∑
l=1
Cljµ
T
l Wvl + F
j
2Wvj
+
N+1∑
l=1
1
2
∇φvjgj(x)R−1jj RljR−1jj
× gTj (x)∇l −
γ−2
2
∇φvjh(x)hT (x)∇j
+
1
4
EjWvjµ
T
j Wvj − F j1 η¯Tj Wvj
λ2N+3 = −1
2
EN+1WvN+1 + F
N+1
2 WvN+1
+
1
4
EN+1WvN+1µ
T
N+1WvN+1
− γ
−2
2
∇φvN+1h(x)hT (x)∇N+1
− FN+11 η¯TN+1WvN+1
λ2N+4 = −
N+1∑
l=1
pT (x)∇φTvlWvl − pT (x)
N+1∑
l=1
∇l (63)
Since f(x) is Lipschitz, one can get
L˙(x) ≤ Υ + Z˜T2
(
Z˜T4 ⊗ IN+1
)
SZ˜4 − Z˜TMZ˜
+ Z˜T

λ1
λ2
...
λ2N+4
 (64)
and (62) becomes λ1 =
∑N+1
l=1 bxl bf . Parameters F
i
2 and
F i1 should be chosen such that matrix M becomes positive
definite. Elements of vector Λ are bounded. Thus:
L˙ < −‖Z˜‖2λmin(M) + Λmax‖Z˜‖+ Υmax + ‖Z˜2‖‖Z˜24‖‖S‖
(65)
Expanding terms in (65) yields:
L˙ < −λmin(M)
(‖Z˜1‖2 + ‖Z˜2‖2 + ‖Z˜3‖2 + ‖Z˜4‖2)
+ Λmax
√
‖Z˜1‖2 + ‖Z˜2‖2 + ‖Z˜3‖2 + ‖Z˜4‖2
+ ‖Z˜2‖‖Z˜24‖‖S‖+ Υmax
< −λmin(M)
(‖Z˜1‖2 + ‖Z˜2‖2 + ‖Z˜3‖2 + ‖Z˜4‖2)
+ Λmax
(‖Z˜1‖+ ‖Z˜2‖+ ‖Z˜3‖+ ‖Z˜4‖)
+ ‖Z˜2‖‖Z˜4‖2‖S‖+ Υmax (66)
For simplicity λmin(M) = λm, Λmax = Λm, Υmax = Υm
and ‖S‖ = Sm. By defining ‖Z˜2‖ = r sin(ϕ) and ‖Z˜4‖ =
r cos(ϕ) where 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ pi2 , one can get:
Λm
(‖Z˜2‖+ ‖Z˜4‖)+ ‖Z˜2‖‖Z˜4‖2Sm
+ λm(M)
(‖Z˜2‖2 + ‖Z˜4‖2) = (67)
− λmr2 + Λmr
(
sin(ϕ) + cos(ϕ)
)
+ Smr
3 sin(ϕ) cos2(ϕ) ≤
− λmr2 +
√
2rΛm +
(
0.385Sm
)
r3 (68)
Thus for
r1 < r < r2 (69)
where
r1 =
λm −
√
λ2m − 1.54
√
2SmΛm
0.77Sm
r2 =
λm +
√
λ2m − 1.54
√
2SmΛm
0.77Sm
relation (67) becomes negative. Tuning parameters F i2s and
F i1s should be selected such that λm becomes large enough to
achieve two goals: making the term under radical sign positive
and making the region in (69) big enough to discard improper
initializations of Wˆvis and Wˆν . Now if
‖Z˜1‖+ ‖Z˜3‖ > Λm
λm
+
√
Υm
λm
+
Λ2m
2λ2m
(70)
with condition (69), L˙ becomes negative. So with proper
initialization, x, Wˆvis and Wˆais and hence Wˆvi − Wˆais
become UUB. According to (36) and using gradient descent
for updating Wˆν and ultimate boundedness of Wˆais and x,
Wˆν becomes UUB too.
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